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Benevolent absolutisms, incentives and Rawls’ The Law of Peoples 
 
A specter is haunting Rawls’ The Law of Peoples (1999; henceforth LOP)1 − the specter of benevolent 
absolutisms.
2
 Benevolent absolutisms are one of the five types of political society that populate Rawls’ 
theory of international justice (4). They respect the basic human rights of their members but do not allow 
for political participation of their citizens. Rawls tells us that they are not well-ordered, and thus cannot 
be members in good standing of what he calls the Society of Peoples (63). Yet Rawls’ statements 
concerning benevolent absolutisms are sparse, the rationale for their exclusion from the Society of 
Peoples is underdeveloped, and the way in which well-ordered peoples are to deal with benevolent 
absolutisms is almost completely overlooked.
3
 In fact the very structure of Rawls’ international theory 
seems, conceptually, to obliterate them.  
Rawls’ theory is structured around his account of different types of peoples and societies. Liberal 
peoples are at the heart of the ideal theory of LOP as the latter is initially conceived as the foreign policy 
of a just liberal democratic polity (10). Decent but non-liberal peoples are central to understand the 
second part of ideal theory by exploring the rationale for toleration in international society (59ff.). In non-
ideal theory, outlaw states are the paradigmatic case of non-compliance with a just law of peoples (90), 
while burdened societies represent cases in which compliance is made impossible by unfavorable 
conditions (105). Within this four-pronged architecture, in which different polities stand for different 
aspects of the law of peoples, benevolent absolutisms float in the background without a clear place in a 
Rawlsian normative account of international politics.  
                                                 
1 All references to LOP in the text will be provided directly as page numbers within brackets. 
2 The wording is taken from the preamble to the Manifesto of the Communist Party, available at: 
www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1848/communist-manifesto (accessed January 2014).  
3 The same is true of the overwhelming majority of Rawls’ commentators (see Beitz, 2000; Buchanan, 2000; Caney, 
2002; Freeman, 2007a and 2007b; Pogge, 2001, 2004 and 2006; Reidy, 2010; Tan 2005; and Wenar, 2006). But see 
Taylor (2011: 286–9), Reidy (2012) and Brown (2002) for partial exceptions and Riker (2014) for a more explicit 
treatment. 
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The paper’s main aim is to develop a principled non-ideal theory to engage with benevolent 
absolutisms.
 
Stated differently, the paper aims to provide a principled guide for the foreign policy of 
liberal and decent peoples with regards to benevolent absolutisms, and to do so within the framework of a 
Rawlsian (normative) account of international relations.  
The main challenge that the paper addresses is, succinctly: How is a just Society of Peoples (or its 
members, when they abide by its prescriptions) to engage with benevolent absolutisms? In order to 
answer this question, I develop a system of positive incentives for benevolent absolutisms to become 
well-ordered. According to Rawls, benevolent absolutisms cannot be the object of sanctions: they respect 
human rights and are not externally aggressive, so they cannot to be treated as outlaw states (92). At the 
same time they are not burdened societies, and so straightforward aid would be inappropriate. Positive 
incentives are thus developed as a conceptual middle-ground between the different types of prescriptions 
of LOP non-ideal theory. 
The paper proceeds as follows. First, I provide a summary of LOP’s ideal theory and explain the 
practical puzzle posed by benevolent absolutisms within LOP’s non-ideal theory. I conclude the first part 
of the paper with the initial statement and justification of the proposed solution to this puzzle: namely, the 
development of an incentive-based strategy. The second part then goes on to develop the incentive-based 
strategy by defining the meaning of incentives and by discussing several potential objections. Finally, in 
the third part, the paper illustrates the incentive strategy with a real-world example, Brunei Darussalam.  
Allow me two observations before embarking on the main discussion. The first is that the paper 
assumes, at least to some extent, the soundness of Rawls’ LOP which is, of course, controversial (see 
especially Beitz; 2000; Buchanan, 2000; Caney, 2002; Pogge, 1994). Nonetheless, there are good reasons 
to do so. First, and most evidently, there are reasons of focus and space. The paper tries to illuminate one 
specific and underdeveloped aspect of LOP, namely the treatment of benevolent absolutisms within its 
non-ideal theory. To defend the framework itself is thus beyond its stated purposes and would require 
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much more space than is available here. Yet, there is one sense in which the framework itself is made 
more plausible by the paper’s argument: working out the implications of a set of general principles for an 
important case and appreciating its plausibility helps us, in the Rawlsian spirit of reflective equilibrium, to 
have more confidence in the principles themselves. 
Of course, the latter point is sound only if we find the paper’s argument as having plausible 
implications for how we deal with benevolent absolutisms. And this brings us to the second observation. 
How we should relate to regimes that are not democratic or decent but respect human rights is a genuinely 
difficult task. The incentive answer provided in the paper puts forward, in my view, a more nuanced 
approach than the indifference of those who see international relations as a realm of power, and the 
intolerance of those who wish to export democracy through war, come what may.
4
 It recognizes the 
importance of political participation for membership in a just Society of Peoples but provides 
recommendations that do not presuppose a black-and-white picture of the world. There is a great deal of 
moral and conceptual space between a perfectly just liberal democracy and a (internally) murderous and 
(externally) aggressive outlaw state. Benevolent absolutisms are situated somewhere in the continuum 
between these extremes. The way we treat them should, at least intuitively, reflect this. I believe the 
incentive-based strategy developed in the paper achieves the latter goal.   
 
The practical puzzle posed by benevolent absolutisms 
The ideal theory of LOP 
Rawls’ theory of international justice is addressed to peoples, not states. Rawls sees states as merely 
rational actors predominantly concerned with their relative power and economic standing (27-28). 
                                                 
4 While the strategy adopted in the paper mirrors aspects of the democratization debate (see Archibugi, 2008; Doyle, 
2012; Welzel, 2009), there are important differences that make the proposal put forward less contentious. First, the 
incentive mechanism is not geared to necessarily reflect a clear preference for a liberal democratic framework but 
only for a system of representative institutions. The latter is a weaker requirement and allows for culturally adaptable 
ways of organizing political society. Second, the incentive model starts from the assumption that force should not be 
used.  
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Instead, peoples have a moral nature and are capable to constrain the pursuit of their rational interests by 
what they see as reasonable (25). A people is prepared to offer fair terms of cooperation to other peoples 
and to honor such terms provided that other peoples are willing to do the same (25). Furthermore, peoples 
lack the traditional powers of sovereignty (25).  Peoples do not have traditional rights to war nor do they 
enjoy rights to unrestricted internal autonomy (26-7).  Peoples are also different from the other types of 
political society that populate Rawls’ international theory. Peoples are well-ordered, while outlaw states, 
burdened societies and benevolent absolutisms are not
5
. Well-orderedness is a central feature of Rawls’ 
definition of a people (41-44). A well-ordered political society’s system of law and institutions are 
organized according to a public conception of justice. Furthermore, a well-ordered political society allows 
its citizens to have a significant role in the process of political decision-making (Pettit, 2006: 43; LOP: 4, 
63).   
According to Rawls, well-ordered liberal peoples are characterized by three main features: a) 
they have a political organization consistent with the model of a constitutional democracy; b) they are 
united by ‘common sympathies’; and c) they endorse a moral/political liberal conception of right and 
justice (23). In LOP Rawls reframes his domestic account of the original position (32) in order to “extend 
a liberal conception to the Law of Peoples” (ibid). Representatives of liberal peoples are placed behind an 
appropriately framed ‘veil of ignorance’ (Rawls, 1971: 118–23).  The veil of ignorance prevents them 
from knowing the size of their territory or population, the relative strength of the peoples they represent, 
their level of economic development or the amount of natural resources available to each people.
6
 
Representatives of liberal peoples would, behind the veil of ignorance, adopt eight principles to govern 
their mutual undertakings: 
                                                 
5 For Rawls, a well-ordered political society is one in which: 1. Everyone accepts, and knows that everyone else 
accepts, the same conception of justice; 2.The society’s basic structure is publicly known, or with good reason 
believed, to satisfy those principles of justice; 3.Citizens have a normally effective sense of justice, which enables 
them to understand and apply the publicly recognised principles of justice and act as those principles require (see 
Rawls, 2001: 8-9).         
6 However representatives of liberal peoples know that they represent liberal peoples. The veil of ignorance in LOP is 
thus ‘thinner’ than the one in A Theory of Justice (1971). 
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1. Peoples are free and independent, and their freedom and independence are to be respected by other 
peoples.    
2. Peoples are to observe treaties and undertakings. 
3. Peoples are equals and are parties to the agreements that bind them. 
4. Peoples are to observe a duty of non-intervention. 
5. Peoples have a right of self-defense but no right to instigate war for reasons other than self-defense. 
6. Peoples are to honor human rights. 
7. Peoples are to observe certain specified restrictions in the conduct of war. 
8. Peoples have a duty to assist other peoples living under unfavorable conditions that prevent their 
having a just or decent political and social regime. 
 
This concludes the first part of LOP’s ideal theory. The second part of ideal theory “extends the Law of 
Peoples to nonliberal peoples” in order to “specify how far liberal peoples are to tolerate nonliberal” ones 
(59). For Rawls, toleration does not simply entail to refrain from coercing or imposing sanctions on those 
who are to be tolerated - it means to respect them as “equal participating members in good standing of 
the Society of Peoples” (59, emphasis added). The second part of ideal theory is thus, according to Rawls 
himself, more complex, as it requires the specification of a nonliberal way of organizing political society 
worthy of toleration. Rawls claims that decent peoples are such kind of political society. Decent peoples 
are not liberal. However, they too are well-ordered. Rawls only provides us with one possible way of 
organizing decent political institutions, what he calls a decent hierarchical society. A decent hierarchical 
society does not have aggressive foreign policy aims (64), its system of law, developed in accordance 
with a common good conception of justice, secures the basic human rights of all citizens (65), imposes 
bona fide moral duties and obligations on its members (65-6), and its public officials have a sincere and 
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not unreasonable belief that a decent hierarchical people’s system of law is effectively guided by a 
common good conception of justice (66-7). A common good conception of justice is not a liberal 
conception of justice and the citizens of a decent hierarchical people are not seen as free and equal and 
entitled to equal representation. However, in a decent hierarchical people, persons are seen as decent and 
rational and the common good conception of justice contains what Rawls calls a decent consultation 
hierarchy that allows “different voices to be heard” and for dissent to be voiced (71-2).  Not only are 
decent hierarchical peoples well-ordered, they too are able to endorse the same principles of international 
justice adopted by liberal peoples. According to Rawls, representatives of decent hierarchical peoples 
would “in an appropriate original position…adopt the same eight principles as those…[that] would be 
adopted by the representatives of liberal peoples” (69). They are thus to be tolerated as equal members in 
good standing of the Society of Peoples. 
 
The non-ideal theory of The Law of Peoples and benevolent absolutisms 
For Rawls, ideal theory assumes that: a) there is full compliance with the normative principles that 
regulate the domain under consideration; and b) there are favorable conditions for the fulfilment of the 
obligations that are given by the relevant normative principles. The breakdown of these assumptions 
corresponds to the two parts of non-ideal theory in LOP. The first deals with cases of ‘noncompliance’, 
and concerns outlaw states (90). Outlaw states display externally aggressive behavior and actively refuse 
to abide by the prescriptions of the Law of Peoples that pertain to the use of force (the right to wage war, 
but also the projection of influence through power) in international relations (90). Well-ordered peoples 
should not tolerate the externally aggressive conduct of outlaw states (92ff.). Severe violations of human 
rights (internal repression) might also be cause enough for legitimate interference or intervention (90 n1; 
93-4 n6). The second part of the non-ideal theory deals with burdened societies, or with what Rawls calls 
‘unfavorable conditions’ (4). Burdened societies are societies lacking the main tools (resources and/or 
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human capital and/or political culture) to become well-ordered; Rawls states that well-ordered peoples 
have a ‘duty of assistance’ towards these burdened societies (90).  
In this neat classification of cases of non-ideal theory, it is striking that there is no clear place for 
benevolent absolutisms. As we have seen, because benevolent absolutisms “deny their members a 
meaningful role in making political decisions they are not well-ordered” (63) and thus cannot be members 
of the Society of Peoples, yet Rawls does not tell us whether they are cases of non-compliance, or of 
unfavorable conditions, or both. Nor does Rawls tell us clearly how decent and liberal peoples should 
conduct their foreign policies in relation to them. For example, does it follow from the fact that 
benevolent absolutisms are not well-ordered that members of the Society of Peoples should have no form 
of interaction with them? Or are benevolent absolutisms merely denied full membership in the Society of 
Peoples? Rawls’ text simply provides no guidance here. However, guidance is clearly needed. Not being 
member of the Society of Peoples provides, per se, insufficient information when it comes to what the 
relationship between members and non-members should be. This is shown by the fact that LOP’s non-
ideal theory prescribes radically different types of engagement with outlaw states and burdened societies. 
Put differently, accepting the fact that benevolent absolutisms are not within the scope of international 
toleration is not enough to understand how well-ordered peoples are to relate to them. Rawls’ conception 
of toleration is based on the idea that liberal and decent well-ordered  peoples who endorse the eight 
principles of LOP for the right reasons are to respect each other as equals as they are all members in good 
standing of the Society of Peoples. However, to deny membership in the Society of Peoples is simply to 
deny a measure of respect. It does not provide clear guidance on how we are to engage with those who are 
not to be respected as equals. 
One might be initially tempted to treat benevolent absolutisms just as outlaw states. Yet the only 
instance in which LOP allows (explicitly) for outside intervention, is when a collective violates human 
rights and/or is externally aggressive (90ff.).  Rawls’ discussion of sovereignty (25–7) and the limited 
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nature of ‘the freedom and independence’ enjoyed by liberal peoples (38) never mentions the lack of 
internal political participation (displayed by benevolent absolutisms) as a genuine reason for outside 
interference. Benevolent absolutisms are not externally aggressive and, by definition, they respect human 
rights. In fact, Rawls goes as far as telling us that they too are entitled to wage war in self-defense since 
any ‘society that is nonaggressive and that honors human rights has the right of self-defense’ (92). Can 
benevolent absolutisms be the object of weaker (compared to the use of force) forms of outside political 
pressures such as economic and diplomatic sanctions? The answer is, at least according to LOP’s text, 
clearly no. When Rawls discusses the role of human rights in LOP, he states that ‘their fulfilment is 
sufficient to exclude justified and forceful intervention by other peoples, for example, by diplomatic and 
economic sanctions…’(80).  Thus no form of coercive political pressure seems to be justified towards 
benevolent absolutisms.
7
  
Finally, it must be noted that benevolent absolutisms and outlaw states have a structurally different 
type of normative relationship with LOP. A political society’s normative relationship with LOP is 
essentially constituted by two main elements: 1) whether the political society respects (for the right 
reasons) the eight principles of LOP themselves; and 2) whether it meets what we can call the 
membership criteria implicitly stated by the eight principles of LOP. The second element refers to the 
idea that the eight principles of LOP are addressed to peoples rather than to political societies generally 
(i.e. only addressed to well-ordered political societies). While outlaw states clearly fail to have an 
appropriate normative relationship with LOP both because they violate its principles and because they do 
not meet its membership criteria, the situation of benevolent absolutisms is potentially more complex. On 
the one hand we have no principled reason to believe that they cannot respect the eight principles of 
                                                 
7 Some may wish to object that, while intervention or sanctions are not warranted, that still leaves open the option of 
public criticism in international forums. Rawls says that this type of criticism is ruled out with regard to decent 
peoples. But I see no reason for it to be ruled out in principle for benevolent absolutisms. The idea of positive 
incentives incorporates and expresses the basic aspect of a public criticism.  
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LOP
8
. On the other hand, they do fail to meet the membership criteria implicitly stated in the eight 
principles of LOP (by definition, benevolent absolutisms are not peoples). It is thus plausible to conclude 
that, at least prima facie, the way in which members of the Society of Peoples engage with benevolent 
absolutisms and outlaw states should differ as well.  
 
The basic elements of the incentive-based strategy 
How are we to engage with benevolent absolutisms within the framework of LOP? For guidance on how 
to proceed it is important to note that the long-term objective of the Rawlsian framework is for all peoples 
to become well-ordered and equal members in good standing of the Society of Peoples. For Rawls, the 
great evils of human history are political in nature. Allegiance to the eight principles of LOP is the best 
we can hope for to banish those evils and make the world a just and peaceful place (5). Rawls’ discussion 
of non-ideal theory is also premised on the idea of progressively enlarging the constituency of the Society 
of Peoples (89). In engaging with benevolent absolutisms, therefore, the long-term objective of LOP 
would seem to be that they too become well-ordered peoples.  
Once we have clarified the non-ideal theory goal of LOP with respect to benevolent absolutisms, we 
still need to devise a strategy for how the Society of Peoples is to engage with them. In what follows I 
want to argue that a fruitful way of constructing this underdeveloped aspect of the non-ideal theory of 
LOP is to imagine the relationship between benevolent absolutisms and the Society of Peoples as one 
based on positive incentives for benevolent absolutisms to become well-ordered. The plausibility of this 
                                                 
8 Here, I mean what they explicitly prescribe, which I take to be different from what, in the text, I refer to as implicit 
membership criteria (i.e. that the principles are addressed to peoples). Since benevolent absolutisms are not externally 
aggressive and respect human rights, there seems to be no clear reason to believe that they would not be able to 
endorse the 8 principles of LOP. Some may object that regimes which do not afford political participation cannot 
truly secure human rights. This seems to be Henry Shue’s view in Basic Rights (1996: 76ff.). However, as Riker 
(2014) argues, Shue’s argument fails to establish that basic rights can only be protected in a context where political 
participation is in place. Riker also shows that other approaches to the instrumental necessity of participation rights 
for the protection of basic rights are unconvincing. Finally he provides an account of Rawls’ understanding of 
benevolent absolutisms which relies on what he defines as the ‘rights view’, namely, that basic rights act as 
preconditions for the enjoyment of political rights, rather than the other way around.  
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strategy requires some explaining. The non-ideal theory of LOP assumes two basic problems and two 
basic remedies to such problems. The two basic problems, as outlined above, are the unwillingness of 
some (outlaw states) and the inability of others (burdened societies) to comply with the eight principles of 
LOP. The two basic remedies are, crudely put, sanctions (economic and/or military and/or diplomatic) for 
those who are unwilling to comply, and aid for those who are unable to do so. To use positive incentives 
in order to encourage benevolent absolutisms to become well-ordered is, essentially, to accept that the 
latter present LOP with a middle ground between the case of outlaw states and that of burdened societies, 
and thus that the strategy used to deal with this aspect of the non-ideal theory of LOP need to reflect this 
middle ground.
9
 But first let me define what I mean by ‘incentives’. Once such definition is in place it 
will be clearer why incentives represent this middle ground effectively. 
 
Developing the Incentive-Based Strategy 
Defining incentives 
Incentives
10
 can be defined as inducements (i.e. a transfer of benefits
11
) from one actor, the sender, to 
another, the target or receiver, with the expectation of a concession on the part of the target or receiver 
                                                 
9 I leave aside the further complication that would arise in a consideration of the level and type of dissent that might 
characterize the internal political life of a benevolent absolutism. If widespread dissent is present and the latter is met 
with force, then the incentive model might be inapplicable. I do not discuss this possibility because the case of 
forceful repression seems closer to the situation of outlaw states. Of course intermediate situations can be imagined 
(such as the containment of dissent by threat of force and targeted arrests of dissenters’ political leaders). In such 
cases the incentive model should be adapted to the circumstances in order to avoid negatively affecting dissenters.    
10 The reference here is to positive incentives. The definition can be further broadened by generalizing it to include 
negative incentives, or sanctions, by conceiving such inducements as causing loss of welfare to the target or receiver. 
Some authors define negative incentives directly as sanctions. For example, Lisa Brooks defines sanctions as ‘the 
imposition of punitive measures on a target state, measures which seek to limit the state’s access to economic 
resources or cultural and social engagement, and limit movements of its nationals in order to elicit a change in the 
target’s policies consistent with the imposer(s) preferences’ (Brooks, 2002: 6). Note also that my definition follows 
the literature on economic statecraft rather than. For a technical overview of the role of incentives in economic theory 
see Laffront and Martimort (2002).  
11 The idea of a transfer of benefits requires a baseline to be meaningful. Some refer to the status quo as the relevant 
baseline (see especially Drezner, 1999b). However, using the status quo baseline, the lifting of an existing sanction 
would count as an incentive. This clearly would not fit with the actual situation of benevolent absolutisms in LOP as 
the latter cannot be the object of sanctions. I thus proceed under the assumption that we can imagine a counterfactual 
baseline defined as the lack of interaction between members of the Society of Peoples and benevolent absolutisms.  
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(see Drezner, 1999a; Crumm, 1995; Baldwin, 1985). While no definition of incentives can be fully 
exhaustive I propose to further specify the structure of an incentive mechanism by taking into 
consideration the following seven parameters:  
1. Their source or origin: who is the sender?  
2. Their content: what is the inducement used? 
3. Their target: who is the receiver? The government, or different elements of the civil society of the 
target? 
4. Their goal: what is the hoped-for concession of the incentive mechanism? 
5. The timescale adopted:
12
 are the inducements a request for short-term or long-term concession? 
6. The welfare and distributional effects
13
 of the inducement on the sender: are they negative or positive 
for the sender as a whole? How does the sender stand to gain or lose? 
7. The welfare and distributional effects of the inducement on the target: are they negative or positive for 
the receiver as a whole? How does the target stand to gain or lose? 
 
With this definition in hand we can, I believe, better understand why incentives are a middle ground 
between cases of non-compliance and unfavorable conditions and the remedies imagined by LOP to 
address them. Incentives share one feature with both remedies that LOP indicates for engaging with cases 
of non-compliance and unfavorable conditions. That is, incentives share the element of conditionality 
with regards to sanctions or the threat of force that is plausibly attached to the Society of Peoples’ 
                                                 
12 I will not further discuss the timescale adopted (parameter 5) in this paragraph. The only comment I wish to make 
is that the latter is likely to be long term in the case of benevolent absolutisms given that the concessions asked for 
are likely to be related to structural reforms of the political system. Some authors exclude long-term timescales from 
their definition of incentives (see Drezner, 1999a: 189). This exclusion is often linked to the desire to empirically test 
the overall success of incentives as a form of instrument rather than implying a conceptual problem with long-term 
goals. Examples of the use of incentives in the long-term include Abdelal and Kirshner (1999–2000) and Papayoanou 
and Kastner (1999–2000).   
13 I use the expressions ‘welfare-positive’, ‘welfare-negative’ and ‘welfare-neutral’ to refer to (likely or intended) 
positive, negative and neutral effects on welfare. Here, ‘welfare’ refers not to individual welfare but to collective or 
aggregate welfare. I remain agnostic on how to define welfare itself (see Reiss, 2013).   
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relationship with outlaw states, while, at the same time, they share the positive (to the receiver) welfare 
effects with regards to aid
14
 as imagined by Rawls for burdened societies (see Table 1). Incentives, as 
defined above, assume that the target is at least capable of complying with the request for concession 
attached to the inducement mechanism – otherwise the entire ‘inducement-based’ strategy would seem 
rather pointless. Incentive provision thus excludes the idea that benevolent absolutisms are simply a case 
of unfavorable conditions as is the case for burdened societies. Furthermore, the idea of providing 
incentives incorporates some aspect of unwillingness. If benevolent absolutisms were willing to become 
well-ordered, inducements would be superfluous. In this respect, then, incentive provision assumes some 
form of commonality between benevolent absolutism and outlaw states when it comes to their attitude 
toward LOP: both are plausibly depicted as unwilling to ameliorate their normative relationship to the 
latter. However, positive incentives, unlike sanctions and coercion more broadly, seem to afford greater 
space for voluntary responses (more on this below).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
14 The assumption of aid’s positive welfare effect is of course contentious if one takes a closer look at the aid 
literature, which provides ample evidence of the unintended consequences of aid, some of which can negatively 
impact local populations (see Wenar, 2003 and 2011; and Gibson et al., 2005 for a detailed summary of the 
evidence). Nonetheless it is not implausible to state that aid is constructed with the aim of having positive effects on 
recipients, while the opposite is true of sanctions. Unintended consequences do not alter the way in which these 
instruments are conceptualized.     
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Table 1. Characteristics of different foreign policy instruments. 
 
Welfare effect 
(receiver) 
Element 
of conditionality 
Welfare effect 
(sender) 
Sanctions Negative Present Negative 
Aid Positive Absent
15
 Open 
Incentives Positive Present Open
16
 
 
 
 
 
What justifies incentive provision to benevolent absolutisms? 
One might be tempted to believe that positive incentives are not really worrisome from a moral point of 
view as they simply involve the offer of a benefit. This would be the natural conclusion if we looked at 
incentives from an economics perspective. In economics incentives are “an offer of something of value 
(…) meant to influence the payoff structure of a utility calculation so as to alter a person’s course of 
action.”  (Grant, 2006: 29). Understood in this way, incentives are but one further form of trade and thus 
are ethically unproblematic. However matters are not so simple. Incentive provision is always marked by 
the desire to influence the target’s autonomous choices (see Grant, 2011). One needs to ask whether, all 
things considered, this type of influence attempt can be justified.  What is the normative justification to 
believe that members of the Society of Peoples are entitled to influence the internal make-up of 
                                                 
15 The meaning of ‘Element of Conditionality’ when referred to ‘Aid’ (see Table 1, raw 3, column 3) is that the 
provision of aid is understood as not being conditional on the performance of any specific action (or commitment to 
perform such action in the future) by the recipient. As one of the reviewers has pointed out, one should also note that 
aid can be understood to be conditional on something, namely, on the condition of need experienced by the agent 
receiving aid. However, as the reviewer suggested, that would be a different way of understanding ‘conditionality’ 
than the one adopted here since the cessation of a condition of need is different from the fulfilment of a requirement 
tied to an incentive or sanction. A possible objection to this way of characterizing aid is that some aid programs do 
feature conditionality elements (see Stokke, 1995). However, the definition of these programs as ‘aid’ or ‘incentives’ 
cannot simply be a matter of how their deliverers label them. Furthermore, within the Rawlsian framework there is no 
mention of conditionality when it comes to providing assistance to burdened societies.      
16 The possibility that incentives have positive welfare effects on the sender is discussed below. 
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benevolent absolutisms? In other words, what justifies the influence attempt on the part of the Society of 
Peoples (or any of its constituent societies) toward benevolent absolutisms?
 17
   
According to Ruth Grant (2006: 32), two of the main criteria to assess the justifiability of 
incentives provision are: a) the legitimacy of their purpose; and b) whether they allow for a voluntary 
response.
18
 Let’s consider them in order. Is the purpose of incentives to benevolent absolutisms 
legitimate? The purpose of the incentive mechanism is for benevolent absolutisms to become well-
ordered and thus compliant with the membership criteria of the Society of Peoples. And, as we have seen, 
according to Rawls, expanding the constituency of the Society of Peoples is the best way to banish the 
great evils of human history. Do positive incentives to benevolent absolutisms allow for a voluntary 
response? The answer to the latter question may seem obvious at first glance: any agent is free to refuse 
the offer of a benefit. However, once again, things are not so simple. The idea of ‘offering a benefit’, per 
se, is insufficient to appraise the voluntariness of the target’s response in the absence of some knowledge 
concerning the alternative courses of action available to the target. For example, a father (sender) may 
offer his child (target) the following incentive: ‘If you study more diligently (request for concession), I 
will stop beating you every morning (inducement)’. While this clearly fits the description of a positive 
incentive, it would be a stretch to argue that this implies that the incentive mechanism allows for a 
                                                 
17 Some may also claim that incentives might lead to ‘bitterness and resentment’, to paraphrase Rawls (1999: 62; 84-
85). That might very well be the case when incentives are provided to well-ordered peoples, yet the situation of 
benevolent absolutisms is markedly different, as their governments do not really represent their citizens. True, 
members of a benevolent absolutism’s government might feel some resentment and bitterness, but such feelings, and 
the potential for conflict that may ensue as a result of such feelings, would be in no way as deep or widely diffused as 
would be the case if incentives were offered to a well-ordered people – the incentives considered in the paper are not 
incentives to alter a system of collective self-rule but rather to create one in the first place. Furthermore, as I argue 
below (see note 29) incentives are much less likely to generate conflict between sender and receiver compared to 
other foreign policy tools such as economic and diplomatic sanctions. Finally as discussed in the paper (see ‘What 
justifies incentive provision to benevolent absolutisms?’) the purpose of the incentive mechanism is for all people to 
become well-ordered, and, according to Rawls achieving such purpose would allow us to eliminate the great evils of 
human history. So, even accepting that there are some risks that incentive provisions can generate conflict, the risks 
seem worth running. This is not to say, however, that such risks should not be minimized whenever possible. The 
goal of minimizing such risks is taken into consideration by my framework by accepting the long term nature of the 
incentive mechanism that allows for a gradual response on the part of the target (see note 12).    
18 Grant also considers a third criterion, namely, the effects on the character of the target. I will not consider this 
criterion as it seems intuitively less relevant once we move from natural to artificial persons.  
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voluntary response.
19
 The child is not really able to respond voluntarily because the only available 
alternative option (to be beaten every morning) implies accepting the daily violation of her/his basic 
rights. This simply reflects something that is intuitively clear, namely, that the nature of the options one 
faces affect the voluntariness of a choice (Olsaretti, 2007).     
What are the options faced by benevolent absolutisms if they refuse to accept the inducements 
offered by well-ordered peoples? Given that well-ordered peoples are not authorized to use explicitly 
coercive measures such as military and economic sanctions (see above, pp. 6-9), the carrot of incentive 
provision towards benevolent absolutisms cannot be coupled, as it often is in the real world (see Cotright, 
1997), with the stick of punishment if the incentives are refused. What if a benevolent absolutism faces a 
scenario where the refusal to accept the incentive mechanism would make it impossible for it to secure 
the basic rights of its members? Given Rawls’ emphasis on basic human rights, the ability to secure such 
rights should clearly count as a constraint on the acceptability of alternative courses of action. However 
benevolent absolutisms are unlikely to face this hypothetical scenario. Benevolent absolutisms, by 
definition, are not burdened societies and respect the basic human rights of their members. We can thus 
presume that they have (prior to any interactions with well-ordered peoples) the relevant social, economic 
and political capital required to secure the basic rights of their citizens. While the former two scenarios 
are not necessarily exhaustive, they seem to address what we often see as problematic about ‘offers to 
help’ in international society: that the help cannot be refused because there is a more coercive alternative 
ready to be deployed and/or because the condition in which members of a political community find 
themselves is such that refusal would imply the acceptance of a great deal of human suffering.  
                                                 
19 Some may wish to add that part of the problem here is the acceptance of a status quo baseline, namely, the abusive 
relationship between father and child. While in terms of welfare the father’s proposal is, strictly speaking, the offer of 
a benefit, most would feel uncomfortable to see it as such. However, this problem does not apply to incentives to 
benevolent absolutisms. As I have argued above (see note 10) the appropriate baseline for incentive mechanism to 
benevolent absolutisms is one in which we do not assume any prior or ongoing forms of interaction. Why so? Given 
that the very point of my argument is to establish the correct type of relationship between the Society of Peoples and 
benevolent absolutisms it would be question-begging to presuppose the existence of prior relationships between 
benevolent absolutisms and members of the Society of Peoples. However, if we adopt this type of baseline, then, a 
positive inducement is more easily portrayed as the offer of a genuine benefit. 
  
16 
 
 
Further problems: appeasement, crowding-out, and paternalism 
Even accepting that incentives to benevolent absolutisms have a legitimate purpose and allow for a 
voluntary response, one may still argue that they pose further problems. Here I briefly consider whether 
the incentive strategy developed by the paper is: a) a form of appeasement; b) counterproductive; c) 
paternalistic. I believe that all three objections fail to apply to the case of benevolent absolutisms. 
Appeasement is a familiar problem in the economic statecraft literature. For example Cotright (1997: 277-
279) explicitly addresses the worry that incentives imply the risk of appeasement with otherwise 
oppressive regimes. However, it should be noted that the concerns with appeasement expressed in the 
economic statecraft literature mainly pertain to regimes that participate in large scale human rights 
violations (the historical examples used by Cotright are North Korea and South Africa). The fact that we 
address benevolent absolutisms (and that the latter respect basic human rights) should defuse the worry. 
Furthermore, the incentive mechanism described in the paper is precisely geared to address the very 
source of the ‘appeasement worry’. In other words, if the ‘appeasement worry’ is based on the idea that 
we should not offer benefits to a political society that, for example, does not protect basic rights to 
political participation, it must be recognized that the very purpose of the incentive mechanism is to alter 
this condition and that the delivery of the benefits that are part of the incentive mechanism is made 
conditional precisely on the gradual development of well-ordered institutions that would allow the 
citizens of a benevolent absolutism to have a greater say in the process of political decision-making.  
A further possibility is that incentives may actually be counterproductive as a result of the so-
called ‘crowding out effect’ investigated by behavioural economists (see Titmuss, 1970). The basic idea 
is that providing monetary incentives for a given socially desirable action may crowd out non-self-
interested motives for the performance of the action and eventually reduce the extent to which the action 
is performed compared to the pre-incentive benchmark. Blood donations are the original illustration of 
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this effect: paying people for donating blood may actually end up reducing the supply of blood donors 
rather than increasing it (see Bénabou and Tirole, 2005; Bowles, 2008). One reason why this problem 
does not apply to benevolent absolutisms is because the crowding out of intrinsic motivation presupposes 
the presence of intrinsic motivation, something that cannot be assumed by the current framework 
concerning benevolent absolutisms. A second reason why the crowding out effect does not apply in the 
case of benevolent absolutisms is that the effect is generally connected to instances of direct financial 
transfers, yet for benevolent absolutisms (and the example of Brunei provided below is but one possible 
illustration) the incentive mechanism does not necessarily refer to monetary compensation (see Lacetera 
and Macis, 2010). 
Finally, one could argue that the attempt to influence benevolent absolutisms through incentives 
is paternalistic. I will not provide an exhaustive definition of paternalism. I will instead limit myself to the 
observation that most accounts of paternalism rely on the idea that the attempt (whether coercive or not) 
to influence the target is performed with a view to the welfare, good or happiness of the target itself (see 
Quong, 2011; De Marneffe, 2006; Sunstein and Thaler, 2003; Arneson, 1980). If we were to acknowledge 
this common aspect of most accounts of paternalism, then incentives to become well-ordered would not 
be paternalistic. While there might be a sense in which liberal and decent peoples think it would be good 
for benevolent absolutisms to become well-ordered, this is not the primary goal of their incentive 
provision. The latter is rather geared to reflect the fact that compliance with the eight principles of LOP is 
a matter of right and that the the goal of LOP, when used as a guide for developing the foreign policy of 
well-ordered peoples, is for all societies to become well-ordered.  
 
The seven parameters in context 
Going back to the parameters stated above, the sender (parameter 1) of the inducements can be: (a) 
members of the Society of Peoples individually; (b) groups of decent or liberal peoples; or (c) the Society 
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of Peoples as a whole (for instance, by way of one of its cooperative institutions). The first case (a) is one 
of bilateral incentive provision, while both (b) and (c) can be defined as cases of multilateral incentive 
provision. The distinction between multilateral and bilateral incentives is also relevant in order to further 
specify the goal (parameter 4) of the incentive scheme. As I mentioned above, the long-term goal of LOP 
is for all peoples to become well-ordered. This goal is symmetrically shifted to become the inherent goal 
of the incentive mechanism. Nonetheless, as the structure of LOP makes clear, there is more than one way 
in which a people can develop well-ordered institutions. Although this number is potentially infinite given 
that Rawls only specifies one example of a decent people, and that there is bound to be great variance 
even between different types of liberal modes of governance, we can at least distinguish three different 
ways of specifying the content (parameter 2) of the goal of the incentive mechanism: to develop liberal 
institutions; to develop decent institutions; and to develop a system of institutions which is neutral with 
respect to liberal or decent forms of institutional make-up (call this an open system).  
In the case of bilateral incentives, or of multilateral incentives from a group of either liberal or 
decent peoples, I believe it should be allowed that the incentives be targeted to develop the types of 
institutions that the sender(s) most prefer(s). For example, it would seem permissible that bilateral help 
from a liberal people could come on condition of the development of liberal democratic procedures. 
While the goal is always to transform benevolent absolutisms into well-ordered peoples, there are many 
types of institutional framework that satisfy that condition, and becoming liberal and democratic certainly 
represents one. Of course, the same would hold if decent peoples provided incentives to a benevolent 
absolutism to develop a consultation procedure modelled on the one available within their common good 
conception of justice. In the case of multilateral incentives from the Society of Peoples as a whole, on the 
other hand – that is, if the incentives are the result of collective agreement on the part of the entire Society 
of well-ordered Peoples (or of one of its cooperative institutions) – then the incentive model should 
remain open to the types of institutions that can be developed by the benevolent absolutism. In other 
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words, when the Society of Peoples acts as the sender what should drive the choice of the goal should be 
less dependent on what members of the Society of Peoples believe to be the best way of organizing a 
political society (there would be no agreement on that score) but instead focused on what all liberal and 
decent peoples’ foreign policy have in common: their wish that all political communities become well-
ordered. Proceeding this way would also allow the Society of Peoples not to provide an implicit statement 
as to its preferred way of organizing the internal political life of its members and thus avoid offending the 
self-respect of some of them. For example, if the Society of Peoples, acting as the sender, assumed that 
the default goal of the incentive mechanism should be to develop liberal well-ordered institutions, this 
would imply that the Society of Peoples considers decent institutions as inferior compared to liberal ones, 
and that would clearly display lack of respect towards decent peoples.    
 
Table 2. Goal specification and sender types. 
 
 
Liberal 
sender(s) 
Decent 
sender(s) 
Society of Peoples as a 
whole (sender) 
Bilateral 
incentives 
Liberal  Decent  n/a 
Multilateral 
incentives 
Liberal  Decent  
Any type of well-
ordered political system  
 
 
 
 
The content (parameter 2) and target (parameter 3) of the incentive mechanism are closely 
connected. Recall that our assumed target has been thus far the category of benevolent absolutisms. Yet 
as the literature on economic statecraft amply demonstrates, the effectiveness of incentive provision 
crucially depends not only on regime type but also on the internal political structure of the receiver or 
  
20 
 
target (see Blanchard and Ripsman, 2013; Escribà-Folch and Wright, 2010; Brooks, 2002).
20
 This line of 
argument will be pursued no further here than to note that the content of the incentive provision is 
potentially vast (see Table 3), and that the best way to ensure that incentives are of the right kind is to pay 
attention to the type of internal political structure of the target (see Table 4) and to the welfare and 
distributional effects (parameter 7) that the inducements have within the target. 
 
Table 3. Examples of inducements classified by issue area.
21
 
Trade Capital 
Technology 
transfer 
Security
22
 
Membership in 
IGOs/regimes 
Positive tariff 
discrimination  
Direct monetary 
payments 
Industrial 
technology 
Non-
aggression 
treaties 
Financial regimes 
(e.g. IMF, IBRD) 
Granting MFN 
treatment 
Investment 
guarantees 
Military 
technology 
Bilateral or 
multilateral 
defence 
treaties 
Trade regimes 
(e.g. WTO) 
Subsidies to 
exports or 
imports 
Encouragement of 
private capital 
exports 
Skill transfers  
for technological 
capacity building 
(industrial) 
Capacity 
building (e.g. 
joint training) 
Security regimes 
(e.g. NATO) 
Granting export 
or import 
licenses 
Favourable access 
to private or 
multilateral 
borrowing 
 
Capacity 
transfer (e.g. 
arms sale) 
Regional 
cooperative 
organizations (e.g. 
EU,
23
 ASEAN) 
                                                 
20 Here I leave aside the further complication of the effectiveness of incentives perhaps being dependent upon what 
we can call international conditions (see Blanchard and Ripsman, 2013: 21–4). 
21 Sources: Baldwin, 1985; Brooks, 2002; Crumm, 1995; Long, 1996.   
22
 The idea that military cooperation of any kind might be an acceptable instrument seems to run contrary to the 
intuition that non-democratic regimes should not be given tools to repress internal dissent. However, any economic 
benefit or inducement can be used to purchase or develop military capacity (see Baldwin, 1985). Thus, the core issue 
of the provision of forms of military cooperation is one of timing and circumstances (i.e. not during episodes of 
political dissent) rather than appropriateness tout court.  
23 For example, see Ethier (2003) for an interesting study of EU accession conditionality procedures linked to 
democratization. According to Ethier, good results were achieved with countries from the former Eastern bloc. Ethier 
also seems to suggest that incentives may not work, but her definition of incentives is much narrower than the one 
adopted here. For the connection between democracy promotion and the use of soft power by the EU beyond 
European borders see Fahkro (2009). 
  
21 
 
 
Table 4. Examples of factors potentially affecting target’s response.24 
Power structure Economic structure Stateness
25
 
Widely dispersed 
power 
Export oriented Decisional capacity 
Regime supported by 
specific economic or 
social groups 
Import substitution 
oriented 
Decisional autonomy 
Regime supported by 
kinship system 
Predominance of primary 
and/or secondary and/or 
tertiary sector(s) 
Level of legitimacy 
 
 
The welfare and distributional effects on the sender (parameter 6) for the incentive provision allows 
us to pay attention to those who provide the incentives and to what they can reasonably expect from the 
target. One of the most pressing issues in the literature on international economic incentives concerns the 
motivational aspects of incentive provision for the sender (see Dorussen, 2011). Of course, the basic 
rationale for the sender is connected to the political concessions it wants to extract from the receiver or 
target. But it is often thought that incentives might have a negative impact on the sender’s welfare and 
that such negative impact might threaten the motivational basis or even the entire commitment of the 
sender to the incentive provision mechanism (Dorussen, 2011).  
While this point is not without merit, I want to suggest that it fails to consider two aspects of the 
incentive mechanism proposed here. First, it relies on a picture of incentives in which the latter are a cost 
to the sender; and, while intuitively plausible, this assumption is not necessarily sound (see Long, 1996: 
                                                 
24 Data drawn from Baldwin, 1985; Crumm, 1995; Brooks, 2002; Blanchard and Ripsman, 2013. 
25 Stateness is a complex parameter developed by Blanchard and Ripsman (2013: 26ff.). It refers to the three aspects 
of a regime mentioned in the ‘Stateness’ column. The first parameter, capacity, refers to ‘the policy resources 
available to the state, which affect its ability to co-opt or coerce key societal groups in the face of economic 
statecraft’ (27). The second, autonomy, refers ‘to the structural ability of the foreign policy executive to construct and 
pursue policies when faced with domestic political opposition’ (26). The third, legitimacy, here understood 
descriptively, broadly reflects the level of internal support for the regime (29–30).  
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22).
26
 Second, the commitment of the sender (in the specific case under consideration here) is not likely to 
be fully determined by looking at the welfare effects (on the sender) of the incentive mechanism. Given 
that Rawls sees well-ordered peoples as moral agents as opposed to simply rational ones (23-30) and that 
the the goal of the incentive mechanism is part of the (moral) aims I have ascribed to them, we can 
conjecture that the senders would be willing to accept at least some welfare losses as a price for the 
success of the incentive mechanism.  
 
 
An example: Brunei Darrussalam 
 
Preliminary remarks 
In the previous two parts of the paper I have justified and developed an incentive-based strategy for 
members of the Society of Peoples to deal with benevolent absolutisms. In what follows I provide a real-
world example of the strategy described, focusing on the case of Brunei Darrussalam. I wish to make a 
few caveats at the outset about the choice of this case and the role the example is meant to play.  
The first point to note is that the Rawlsian categorization of peoples cannot be applied too rigidly to 
the real world. If it were, there would be few liberal democracies, few decent peoples, few (if any) 
benevolent absolutisms, and very possibly many outlaw states and burdened societies. This is not to say 
that the categorization of existing political communities along Rawlsian lines is arbitrary, but only to 
signal that how we categorize different (existing) political communities within the Rawlsian framework 
                                                 
26 Long  states that ‘incentives, unlike sanctions, to the extent that they open new opportunities for trade and 
exchange … create opportunities for both sender and recipient to garner a portion of the new gains from trade – an 
improvement in economic utility for both’ (1996: 22). A further advantage of incentives is that they lower the chance 
(compared to sanctions) of creating a ‘rally around the flag effect’ (see Cortright, 1997). By ‘rally around the flag 
effect’ I refer to the nationalistic responses that are often generated as a result of the imposition of sanctions. The 
rally around the flag effect can have the result of making sanctions self-defeating (i.e. to generate the very political 
support that undermines their effectiveness). In the economic statecraft literature, incentives are considered less likely 
to produce this effect because, behaviourally, they tend to foster cooperation rather than hostility (Cotright, 1997: 10).        
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depends on judgment and on the extent to which we believe that the parameters of their ideal type are met 
to a sufficient degree.  
Second, benevolent absolutisms are defined, in part, as political societies that respect human rights. 
A crucial aspect of how we choose to define a given political community as a benevolent absolutism thus 
depends on what we consider to be respect for human rights. To give just a single example, if human 
rights are meant to incorporate political rights, then the very idea of a ‘human rights-respecting 
benevolent absolutism’ would be self-contradictory and essentially conceptually incoherent. In what 
follows I adopt the Rawlsian framework to define what basic human rights are and thus I take for granted 
that the presence of political rights can be treated as a separate issue (indeed, as the motivating factor 
behind the incentive mechanism), but not as an aspect of basic human rights themselves.  
Third, the example is not meant to signal that the incentive-based strategy would necessarily 
succeed for the case in hand (or at least not in the short-term and under actual existing political 
conditions).
27
 The incentive-based strategy developed in the paper takes for granted that those providing 
the incentives are correctly motivated.
28
 In other words, it assumes that decent and liberal peoples’ 
foreign policies are based on the moral character that Rawls assigns to them, and that their goal is for all 
peoples to become well-ordered. In the real world, we know that this is not the case. Yet, the success of 
the incentive mechanism I am suggesting would necessarily be affected by the distance that exists 
between the foreign policies of liberal and decent peoples as they should be and as they are.   
 
Brunei Darussalam: Basic data and human rights record 
                                                 
27 However, some analysts do believe that it could be a more effective reform strategy than the one recently adopted 
in the Middle East by the US (see Cook, 2005). 
28 Note that while the questions of policy toward benevolent absolutisms are part of non-ideal theory, those acting on 
the prescriptions of non-ideal theory can still be relied upon to act according to motives that are in line with the ideal 
theory of LOP.  
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Brunei Darussalam is a small kingdom in South East Asia with a population of 412,000.
29
 Its government 
is highly autocratic, and all the executive and legislative power is formally or informally exercised by the 
royal family headed by Sultan Haji Hassanal Bolkiah. The small state’s economic life is dominated by 
natural gas and oil exports which constitute the main source of economic revenue for the sultanate. As a 
result of its large oil and gas reserves and its ability to export efficiently in global markets and 
increasingly to neighboring countries, Brunei’s GDP30 stands at close to $17 billion and its GNI31 is 
$31,590 per-capita. (The figure is even higher, $45,690, if considered in PPP
32
 terms.)
33
 This makes 
Brunei one of the richest countries in the world (on a per capita basis). But while aggregate data all too 
often mask a picture of unbearable inequality and deprivation, most indicators concerning human 
development and human rights in fact paint a much more nuanced picture of the country. Its primary 
school enrolment rate is virtually 100%, with no significant difference between boys and girls. Its life 
expectancy at birth is 78, and the state spends significant amounts of money to provide social security to 
its citizens. The Human Development Index itself, an aggregate measure of different aspects of 
population welfare in a country, ranks Brunei as 30th
 
in the world with an HDI of 0.8555, steadily rising 
from 0.830 in 2000, and compared to a world average of 0.694.
34
   
Of course this is not to suggest that ‘all is well in Brunei’. The idea of an idyllic place is far from 
reality. The country is, after all, an absolute monarchy and the idea of pluralism in political life is, to put 
it mildly, unwelcomed. Furthermore, religious pluralism is curtailed by the prohibition on all non-
Muslims to proselytize and practice their religion in public. Nonetheless, Brunei’s human rights record is, 
according to several international sources, substantially good. Most of the human rights limitations 
                                                 
29 All data in this section is taken from the World Bank’s website unless it is otherwise specified (available at: 
http://data.worldbank.org/country/brunei-darussalam, accessed December 10th 2013).   
30
 GDP stands for gross domestic product. 
31
 GNI stands for gross national income. 
32PPP stands for purchasing power parity.   
33 United Nations Development Programme Source, Human Development Indicators: 
http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/BRN.html, accessed December 5th 2013).   
34 United Nations Development Programme Source, Human Development Indicators: 
http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/BRN.html, accessed November 1st 2013).   
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reported by the US State Department in its 2012 report are connected to freedom of expression and the 
lack of political rights. These are compounded by some religiously motivated gender discrimination. But 
it is noteworthy that no case of political violence or repression is reported, that women are actively part of 
public life and of the workforce, and that religious diversity, if not encouraged or welcomed, is not 
persecuted; all forms of religious practice are legal if privately held. As the (US) Department of State 
makes clear, ‘there were no known reports of human rights abuses by government officials during the 
year [2012] and impunity was not a problem’.35  
Lest one suspect that the judgment provided by the US Department of State is politically motivated 
by the commercial relationships between the US and Brunei, the 2012 Amnesty International Country 
Report for Brunei, paints a (largely) similar picture. Once again, while the record is not immune from 
criticism, it is one in which government officials seem to respect the basic rights of citizens and 
institutional corruption and abuses of power are limited if not non-existent. Brunei has also displayed a 
similar attitude when it comes to international procedures connected to human rights regimes. The 
country participated in the sixth Universal Periodic Review conducted by the UN Human Rights Council 
and maintained a constructive attitude toward the proceedings.
36
 
In short, Brunei is a good example of a Rawlsian benevolent absolutism. The country is non-
aggressive in its foreign policy, and it respects, albeit imperfectly, the basic human rights of the 
population. The judgment that Brunei is a good example of a benevolent absolutism is also reinforced by 
the fact that, as mentioned above, we can allow for real-world examples to diverge in some measure from 
the ideal types provided by LOP. In addition, the extent of the reported human rights violations is further 
reduced if we adopt, as the paper’s framework does, the Rawlsian definition of basic rights, thus 
                                                 
35 The quote is from the executive summary of the US Department of State, Brunei 2012 Human Rights Report, 
available at: www.state.gov/documents/organization/204398.pdf (accessed November 12th 2013). 
36 Complete documentation for Brunei’s participation in the Periodic Review can be found at: 
www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/UPR/PAGES/BNSession6.aspx (accessed November 18th 2013). 
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excluding complete freedom of conscience and political rights as part of the definition of human rights 
(78–81).  
Brunei falls short of the standards required to be considered a well-ordered people, and thus cannot 
be an equal member in good standing of the Society of Peoples. However, its respect for basic human 
rights and its peaceful foreign policy make it sovereign over its people and territory. The incentive 
mechanism devised in the paper allows members of the Society of Peoples to engage with a benevolent 
absolutism such as Brunei, and to do so without relinquishing their goal of a world exclusively populated 
by well-ordered peoples. In the previous part of the paper I developed the general framework for this 
mechanism, and in the following section I will apply the framework to the particular case of Brunei.  
 
Brunei Darussalam: The incentive mechanism  
In what follows I briefly discuss the application of the incentive mechanism to Brunei Darussalam, by 
way of assigning a specific ‘value’ to the aforementioned seven parameters. Before doing so I wish to 
note that, as the discussion following the general explanation of the parameters above makes clear, there 
are a vast number of factors potentially affecting the choice of instrument for the incentive mechanism. 
To provide a full discussion of even a single case would require more space than is available here.  
Thus, in order to restrict the scope of the parameters, I will fix four of them, and partly determine a 
fifth. I will assume that the incentive mechanism is put in place by the Society of Peoples (parameter 1) 
and that it does not require transition to full liberal democratic status (parameter 4). Instead, I will suggest 
that the best way forward is to concentrate on the enhancement of the representativeness and powers of 
Brunei’s Legislative Council (more on this below).   
The latter point immediately raises the following issue: what justifies the exclusive focus on political 
participation? The goal of the incentive-based strategy is for benevolent absolutisms to become well-
ordered, however, being well-ordered is a much more extensive and nuanced criterion compared to 
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political participation taken in isolation. My choice is motivated by two main reasons. Firstly, Rawls 
explicitly states that benevolent absolutisms are not well-ordered because they do not allow their 
members to have a meaningful role in the political process (Rawls, 1999: 4, 63). It thus seems safe to 
assume that the greatest obstacle for a benevolent absolutism when it comes to the transition towards 
well-ordered political institutions is represented by the lack of representative political institutions. 
Secondly, the choice, as I will explain below, is also motivated by recent political developments inside 
the specific target under consideration (Brunei). The introduction of more genuinely representative 
institutions has been already internally considered and this seems to allow the incentive mechanism to 
intervene in an already ongoing political debate. Doing so gives the incentive mechanism higher 
likelihood of success (since there should be at least some form of internal constituency ready to support 
the changes suggested via the incentive mechanism).  
I will also assume that, given the size of Brunei, the incentive mechanism is welfare-neutral with 
respect to the sender and does not have distributional effects internal to the sender (parameter 6). 
Furthermore, I will assume that the timescale necessary for the incentive mechanism to succeed is 
medium- to long-term. The sought-after concessions pertain to the way in which the country is governed. 
Longer timescales are to be expected in order to allow for adjustment (parameter 5). Finally, given that 
we are considering how to develop the incentive mechanism for a specific example, Brunei Darussalam, 
the target of the incentive mechanism is automatically fixed (parameter 3). I will thus concentrate on the 
two remaining parameters: the content of the incentive mechanism (parameter 2), and the welfare and 
distributional effects of the incentive mechanism on the target (parameter 7). However, I will also have 
something to say about how to improve the representativeness of political institutions in Brunei 
(parameter 4).   
Given Brunei’s very high per capita income (see above), direct monetary inducements are unlikely 
to work effectively. Yet, as we have seen, the content or inducement of the incentive mechanism can vary 
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widely. Exclusive reliance on monetary transfers is unnecessary. The superfluity of monetary transfers is 
reinforced by that fact that Brunei’s government spends substantial parts of its budget on social services; 
the (aggregate) GNI figure is also, to some extent, translated into some genuine benefits for the general 
population. On the other hand, the main challenges that Brunei faces are its dependence on foreign 
partners for its security and defense vis-a-vis its neighbors, and its economy’s excessive reliance on 
natural resources exports (see Roberts, 2012).
37
 It thus seems appropriate to think that the content of the 
inducement mechanism should be the aim to moderate the dependence on oil resources of Brunei’s 
economy by encouraging diversification and by assuaging its external security threats. I do not have 
sufficient space to detail the specific choice of instruments, but it is worth mentioning that technology and 
skill transfers linked to the development of the non-resources-based sector, coupled with preferential 
access for exports, are usually considered the standard tools to achieve that goal. In the same way, 
constructing a realistic incentive mechanism concerning the provision of security against external threats 
would require a much more detailed analysis of regional security in South East Asia. Nonetheless, it 
seems safe to assume that Brunei’s small population, coupled with its considerable natural resources and 
territorial disputes with much larger neighbors (chiefly Malaysia, but also China: see Roberts, 2012), 
would make it susceptible to an instrument that promised a guarantee of its territorial and economic 
sovereignty through joint defense agreements.
38
    
Once the instruments of the incentive mechanism are defined, it remains to be seen how to further 
specify the goal of the mechanism and how such specification would interact with the likely distributional 
effects (within the target) of the instruments selected. Once again, the discussion can only be cursory. 
                                                 
37 These are genuine challenges for Brunei. Relying on foreign security forces lessens Brunei’s independence on the 
international stage. Relying on fossil fuels as the main source of economic activity and state revenues makes the 
country vulnerable to price fluctuations in commodities markets and/or to potential depletion problems.         
38 Roberts (2012) signals that Brunei’s armed forces are still, to date, ill-equipped and understaffed to provide the 
country with an effective deterrent (2012: 45), and that there is already strong dependence on the UK and Singapore 
for effective sovereignty (2012: 46). Brunei also cooperates closely with the US on defence-related matters and the 
two countries have signed a Memorandum of Understanding on Defence Cooperation in 1994 (see 
www.mofat.gov.bn/index.php/bilateral-relations/item/90-united-states-of-america, accessed November 20th 2013). 
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That said, greater representativeness for Brunei’s citizens could be achieved by encouraging, or more 
accurately reviving and augmenting, the role of the Legislative Council within the system of governance. 
The Legislative Council was convened in 2005 after 20 years of inactivity (see Talib, 2013). The Council 
is mostly appointed by the Sultan, and its role is largely symbolic. Plans to make the Council at least 
partly elected have been the object of ongoing political deliberations. But, they recently seemed to have 
stalled (see Roberts, 2012). Yet given that the institution is part of Brunei’s traditional system of 
governance, and that its representativeness has already been discussed, suggesting changes to its 
composition and powers would constitute a precise and politically realistic way of specifying the goal of 
the incentive mechanism. For example, the Legislative Council’s composition could cease to be 
controlled by the Sultan, and gradually become more representative of the citizenry. While a Legislative 
Council elected through universal suffrage is not a requirement, one can conjecture that, following the 
model of Kazanistan, the different social groups constitutive of Brunei’s society may eventually gain 
some form of representation.  In the same way, one could also conjecture a gradual evolution of the 
Legislative Council’s role, not simply its composition. The merely advisory role it currently has could be 
changed into a more substantively consultative one where the Council’s opinions are taken into account 
and affect legislative outcomes.
39
 
The distributional effects of the inducement coupled with the greater role of the Council in the 
internal politics of Brunei are likely to have positive welfare effects (not to mention symbolically and 
politically relevant ones) on Brunei’s middle class.40 Although they would diminish the royal family’s 
control over internal politics they would not necessarily worsen their economic prospects nor would they 
require the total eclipse of their role within governing institutions. Whether these combined effects would 
be enough to trigger political pressure to accept the inducement is difficult to say. But the incentive 
                                                 
39 In this passage I borrow from Rawls’s discussion of a decent consultation hierarchy (LOP: 77). 
40 For example, the incentive scheme could positively affect the local population by inducing smaller military 
expenditure and through skilled job creation as a result of economic diversification.  
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mechanism seems to positively affect the position of the emerging middle classes, and does not impose 
prohibitive losses on the actual governing elite. It thus offers a plausible framework to work with.           
 
Table 5. The incentive mechanism for Brunei Darussalam. 
Parameter Value 
1. Source/origin Assumed as Society of Peoples 
2. Content 
Special market access, technology transfer, and skill transfer for 
economic diversification; military cooperation for defense 
purposes  
3. Target Assumed as Brunei Darussalam 
4. Goal 
Greater political participation through enhancement of the role of 
the Legislative Council 
5. Timescale adopted Assumed as long-term (5–15 years) 
6. Welfare and 
distributional effects 
on the sender 
Assumed as neutral 
7. Welfare and 
distributional effects 
on the target 
Welfare positive for the country as a whole; favorable 
distributional effects for members outside the governing elite  
 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
In this paper I have extended the non-ideal theory of Rawls’ The Law of Peoples to benevolent 
absolutisms. I have claimed that the most effective way of extending the non-ideal theory of LOP is to 
provide benevolent absolutisms with positive incentives to become well-ordered. I have also provided a 
concrete example of how to use the incentive mechanism. 
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